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Abstract
Cyber deception has been discussed as providing
enhanced cyber defense. This human subjects research,
one of the first rigorously controlled studies on this
topic, found that host-based deception was effective
at preventing completion of a specific exfiltration task
against a virtual network. In addition to impeding
progress and preventing success, the deception resulted
in increased confusion and surprise in the participants.
This study provided the necessary rigor to scientifically
attest to the effectiveness of cyber deception for cyber
defense with computer specialists.
1. Introduction
Traditional network defense practices are proving
to be increasingly ineffective at stopping the relentless
and innovative offensive maneuvers of cyber attackers.
Cyber deception is a growing part of the defender’s
arsenal aiming to slow down or prevent compromise
by introducing confusion, frustration, or other
psychological effects to the cyber attackers themselves.
Most research on cyber deception has been on
honeypots [1] or honeynets [2], decoy documents
[3], or decoy network nodes [4]. However, there are
many additional avenues defenders may take to muddle
opponents and grant their systems an air of uncertainty.
In our study, we devised a novel approach of
deceiving network intruders and measuring the effects
on their campaign in terms of both success and
cognition in an experiment. We have utilized a
tool called Moonraker to intercept specific commands
and react in deceptive ways. The experiment was
conducted as a technical class teaching red team
methodologies. Unbeknownst to the participants,
Moonraker was utilized in the exercise portion of
the class for half of the participants, configured to
intercept the primary commands needed to complete the
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task. Completion required participants to enumerate a
network’s hosts, connect to one of the hosts, copy a
malicious file to the host, execute the file, and retrieve
its output. A post-exercise survey was given to capture
participants’ feelings and feedback on several fronts,
including: emotional experiences (doubt, confusion, and
frustration), past expertise in relevant technical skills,
questions about their suspicion of the use of deception
in the exercise, and, to further reinforce the cover story
of the experiment being a training class, questions about
the instructive material and exercise.
We hypothesized that the added deceptive actions
would impede attacker progress and create a more
frustrating and time-consuming attacker experience.
While other researchers have made similar claims
[5] [6], this is one of the first rigorously controlled
experiments to examine the effectiveness of deception
for cyber defense. To test our hypothesis, there were
several metrics that were computed, including success
on task, command success ratios, and self-reported
emotions from the survey. It is generally not feasible
to collect some of these metrics when an adversary is
operating on a network, nor is it possible to control
the environment as needed to attribute the cause to the
experimental manipulation. As such, this research study
provides a valuable contribution–scientific validation of
the efficacy of cyber deception for defense.
2. Related Work
A variety of cyber deception techniques have been
developed to thwart attackers, such as honeypots [1]
and decoys [4]. Over the past several years, researchers
have sought to determine the effectiveness of deceptive
defenses by conducting studies with human participants.
These studies have primarily focused on determining
the realism of deception, measuring the difference in
time on deceptive versus real assets, and assessing the
abilities of deceptive techniques to detect attackers.
Sample sizes were often small and most did not employ
control conditions for comparison [6], thus they lacked
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the necessary rigor to determine causative effects of the
deception.
Other studies have entailed examining deception
theoretically using game theory without human
participants. These studies took a game theoretic
approach, which provided a quantitative framework for
reasoning about decisions given in scenarios where the
players are either unaware or uncertain about the intent
of opposing players [7].
One game theory study presented a new framework
for autonomous cyber deception games in which each
of the game’s agents had their own perception of the
game being played and the moves being taken [7].
In this framework, an agent may manipulate other
players’ perceived payoffs to convince them to take
sub-optimal actions. The primary contribution of this
work was a model of defensive cyber deception in which
defender agents control attacker agents’ perceptions of
the cyber environment. The ultimate goal consisted
of informing future cyber defense systems, enabling
more sophisticated responses to attackers’ behaviors,
and improving defensive posture.
Another way to thwart attackers consists of
exploiting their tendency to trust computer systems to
tell them the truth [8]. Rowe provided a theory for
defensive deception planning designed to encourage
attackers to leave by convincing them that their plans
could not succeed. Their theory included elements
related to when and how to deceive attackers as well
as how to monitor the attacker’s acceptance of the
deception. He closed the article by stating the need
to test against human attackers. In a separate line
of work, Rowe and colleagues conducted experiments
with human participants to determine how much
distortion they could detect in text [9]. They found
that participants could detect text manipulations to a
significant degree, but not perfectly. They concluded
that randomly modified sentences can be detected
despite a lack of familiarity with the subject matter,
even though people found it difficult, in general, to
detect deception. However, in a second experiment,
participants could not detect fake directories. In
this case, the context was sufficiently lacking, and
context is a key resource in detecting deception.
Along similar lines, Karuna et al. [10] presented
a new framework which created false documents
that were intentionally difficult to understand. They
had participants answer comprehension questions after
reading the documents and found statistically significant
effects of the technique. Shu and Yan [11] asserted
that one of the essential elements of deception is
ensuring an internally consistent environment. They
developed a technique to create an FTP file system
free of inconsistency and asked students to determine
whether or not the environment they were attacking
was deceptive. The results revealed that the students
underestimated the presence of deception.
Jafarian and colleagues [12] explored additional
ways of interfering with attackers’ abilities to conduct
reconnaissance by designing a multi-dimensional
deceptive technique to interfere with it. They
demonstrated the effectiveness of this process by
significantly increasing the workload for six expert
participants. The Air Force Institute of Technology
demonstrated the usefulness of manipulating system
traffic to deceive an attacker’s operating system (OS)
fingerprinting as part of their network scanning efforts
[13]. Since determination of the OS drives so much
of the strategy in formulating attack vectors, Murphy
found misleading network profilers to be a strong tactic,
albeit one that could use some strengthening in the form
of more developed tools and experienced configuration.
Lastly, in a set of experiments, Ferguson-Walter
and colleagues [14] demonstrated that deceptive
techniques, such as decoy systems, can increase attacker
uncertainty regarding what is real and what is not
when assessing a network. Their findings also showed
that decoy systems distracted attackers from real assets
and content, as well as slowed attacker behavior
and disrupted their progress. Following up on these
findings, Ferguson-Walter and colleagues [4] conducted
a larger-scale study including over 130 red teamers
to understand how defensive deception, both cyber
and psychological, affects cyber attackers. To date,
this (Tularosa study) is the largest study utilizing a
professional red team population. The red teamers took
part in a network penetration task over two days in
which the researchers controlled both the presence of
and explicit mention of deceptive defensive techniques.
In addition to collecting extensive cyber data, the
study collected psychological and physiological data to
assess attackers’ reactions to the exercise. While there
are similarities, the Moonraker study was designed to
determine the effectiveness of deceptive responses to
attacker commands, thus concentrating on host-based
deception; while the Tularosa study focused on network
deception. In addition, thie Moonraker study examined
the feasibility of using computer specialists rather than
red teamers as participants for such experiments.
3. Design
3.1. Conditions
We examined the effectiveness of cyber deception
at degrading network attacks and affecting attackers’
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cognitive processes. The experiment varied the
conditions of a hands-on cyber attack task. Participants
were randomly assigned to one of two conditions in
a between-subjects design: the Deception condition,
in which unwitting participants encountered deceptive
responses to commands, or the Control condition, in
which they encountered no deceptive responses.
Participants worked individually to attack a virtual
network and were instructed to operate with the mindset
of a red teamer. Due to the use of generic computer
specialists rather than professional red teamers, training
was provided to introduce or review commands that
would be needed in the task and help them adopt an
adversarial mindset. The task-specific techniques were
intermixed with common techniques not specifically
needed for completion of the task. In order to introduce
the prerequisite training, participants were told that they
were evaluating the contents of a training video designed
to teach cyber red teaming skills. To help gauge the
effectiveness of the training, a hands-on network attack
exercise using the skills learned followed the video. This
cover story was used during the participant recruitment
process and supported throughout the course of the
seven-month, ten session study.
3.2. Cyber Range
For the hands-on exercise, each participant was
presented with an identical view of the environment.
The network was designed to be a small cluster of
workstations running simulated SCADA software. The
network setup (including hostnames, IP addresses, and
MAC addresses) was identical in all environments,
though between the Control and Deception conditions
the machines behind some network nodes had key
differences. The deceptive responses were provided by a
capability called Moonraker, a product of the Air Force
Research Laboratory’s Firestarter Program, which was
adapted for use in this study.
In the Control condition there were five Windows
workstations and a single Linux system. The Linux
system was used to isolate traffic within the environment
from the rest of the network by only allowing specific
connections into and out of the environment. Outbound
connections were limited to the command and control
channel required for the Moonraker client to receive
commands from and provide logs to the Moonraker
server. Inbound connections were limited to Remote
Desktop Protocol (RDP) from the corporate network to
an individual system which acted as the foothold into the
experiment network. Of the five Windows systems, one
was set up to be the participant’s initial RDP system (the
environment acting as the first foothold on the network
they’re attacking) and four were other remote systems
on the network.
For the Deception condition, only three Windows
workstations and a single Linux machine were
present. The Linux system and participants’ foothold
environments were configured the same in both
conditions. Moonraker intercepted calls to certain
commands that revealed available hosts on the network
and added on two decoys to the results. It additionally
intercepted specific commands destined to these decoys
and returned results as if they were valid machines
on the network. Moonraker further manipulated the
input to and results of certain commands targeted to the
true remote Windows machines to provide additional
deception for the experiment. In the remainder of
this paper, these machines are referred to as responsive
hosts to differentiate them from both the decoys and
the real hosts from the Control condition. Usernames
and passwords for all Windows systems were provided
to participants. The username was the same on all
systems; however the password was different between
the initial RDP system (their first foothold environment)
and the other Windows systems on the network. This
was done in order to prevent Windows from using
the local credentials when issuing commands requiring
authentication. In this way, participants were required
to include passwords for such authenticated commands,
emulating normal attacker experiences during their
campaigns.
Since the systems in use were basic Microsoft
Windows installations and not actual SCADA systems,
we designed a set of services to be the target of attacks.
A pair of services was installed on each of the real
workstations hosts that were not the initial RDP system.
Since the services were not installed on the starting
system, participants were required to move laterally to
a second system to be successful in their attack. These
services did not perform any additional function.
Each environment was prevented from accessing the
internet or other corporate resources in order to reduce
potential confounding variables. This also prevented the
use of external tools to bypass the deception techniques
of Moonraker. Participants were required to use built-in
Windows command-line-only tools that were found in a
default installation. Two exceptions to this rule existed:
participants were instructed not to use PowerShell, and
both xcopy and move were administratively disabled
to prevent participants from using tools for which
Moonraker manipulations were unavailable.
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3.3. Moonraker
Moonraker provided a framework for monitoring
and actively manipulating memory and processes. It
can be customized to remotely hook and intercept
system application programming interface and internal
function calls, providing the ability to inject code,
observe, and gain control of memory and processes
running on a system. Moonraker was used in this
study to manipulate behavior of participants’ commands
to implement deceptive responses. For this study,
Moonraker was adapted to remotely intercept a specific
set of commands that participants were most likely
to use to execute six specific tactics, techniques,
and procedures (TTPs) listed in the ATT&CKTM
framework [15] to successfully execute their objective.
For all commands, the Control condition responded
normally. Each TTP is outlined below, followed by an
explanation of the response in the Deceptive condition.
There are two types of hosts in the Deception condition:
decoys and responsive hosts. Decoy hosts are false
hosts that, when selected by participants, do not allow
progress beyond TTP2. Responsive hosts are responsive
to all TTPs, but the commands are intercepted by
Moonraker and a deceptive response is given for certain
predefined commands.
TTP1: Local network enumeration via the net view
command. In the Deception condition, two of the
hosts (the first and last in the list) were decoys thus
obfuscating the true configuration of the network. A
target system is selected.
TTP2: Connect from their local host to an admin
share on the host they selected to target in the previous
TTP. In the Deception condition, if the participant
selected a responsive host from the list of four possible
targets, the participants’ commands produced results as
expected. If participants selected a decoy host, the
net use command was intercepted by Moonraker and
reported as success when, in fact, it failed. Participants
were unable to successfully complete the next step in the
TTP sequence on decoy hosts. The only way forward
was to return to TTP1 to restart the attack and select a
responsive host.
TTP3: Copy an executable file
(process dump.exe) to the system chosen in the
previous TTP. In the Deception condition, various
Windows commands were intercepted and a deceptive
response was given. In instances where the participant
chose a decoy host during TTP2, their attempts to copy
this file resulted in standard Windows errors stating that
the drive or path was not valid. This forced participants
to go back to prior TTPs and reattempt their commands
which continued to report success. When a responsive
host was selected in TTP2, the first copy command
submitted resulted in copying a different executable file
but retaining the filename specified by the participant.
This was often undetected until later in the attack
sequence, typically discovered by the observing that the
executable did not create an output file as it should.
TTP4: Schedule a task to run the executable
file copied in the previous step to generate the
SCADA process list. In the Deception condition, the
schtasks command was manipulated using Moonraker to
schedule the task five minutes later than the participant
intended. The intent of this deception was to waste
additional time (above the five minute delay) in activities
such as debugging to determine why no output had
been produced, querying the list of scheduled tasks, or
re-executing TTP4.
TTP5: Stage the process list file for exfiltration.
Participants were required to copy the process list
file from the remote host to their local host. The
Windows copy and type commands were manipulated
to implement the deceptive response, corrupting the file.
Participants who checked the file contents after copying
the file would be made aware of the corruption and could
remedy it through repeated attempts to copy the file.
Those who did not check the contents of the copied
file were unaware of the manipulation, positioning
themselves for failure in their task to exfiltrate the
process list.
TTP6: Exfiltrate the process list file to a designated
server. Participants were reminded to use the pre-staged
pscp, the Putty Secure Copy client tool, in order to
simplify the exfiltration of the data. No deception was
introduced in this step.
3.4. Cyber Data
In order to capture the full set of data generated by
participants and the systems within the environments,
four types of log collection were enabled. Since
traditional key loggers only capture keystrokes, a
custom key logger was developed that also recorded the
date and time of the first key press as well as when the
ENTER key was pressed. This allowed us to record
the time between commands and the time a participant
spent typing a command. The command prompt was
modified in order to record the commands typed by
the participant and the text response displayed to the
participant as a result of that command. Two additional
data sources were used as backups. Moonraker’s
internal logging mechanism recorded the commands
it received at the server and video recording software
captured a recording of the participants’ desktops during
the experiment.
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Several timestamps were collected to track subject
activity. These were used to calculate how long a
subject took to complete a command and to start the
next command. Each of the task’s six TTPs had a
list of commands that were defined as commands that
could be used to successfully complete that part of the
task. These TTP commands were the primary means of
gauging subject progress and used during data coding
to determine whether the command was successful in
completing the specific TTP’s task or not. Depending
on the command, specific flags or arguments were
required for success to be recorded. Additional flags
or arguments did not prevent a label of successful if
it still performed its noted TTP task. Typographical
errors, either in the command itself or any of its required
arguments, caused a label of unsuccessful. False success
reported to subjects in some deception responses was
also labeled as unsuccessful, as the subject had not truly
completed the TTP.
Using the TTP commands alongside their noted
success or failure, we tracked TTP progression in two
ways: overall progress and on a per-host basis. Once
a given TTP was successfully completed, the overall
progress was updated to note the transition to the
next TTP, marking anything past TTP6 completion as
post-success. As subjects were able to switch targeted
hosts, the per-host progress tracked completion of TTPs
in a similar way for each given host.
3.5. Individual Measures
Participants completed surveys after training
and after the exercise to gather demographic data,
personality characteristics, and self-reported reactions
to the task. Prior to the exercise, participants were asked
to describe their experience in system administration,
network defense, red teaming, and their appraisal
of the training video. Following the exercise,
personality was assessed using the BFI-44 [16] to
assess their openness to experience, conscientiousness,
extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. This
personality assessment has been used in previous
studies of defensive deception [4]. A post-exercise
survey collected participants’ self-reports of thoughts,
actions, and emotional reactions during the task on
Likert scales.
4. Implementation
4.1. Participants
The participants were selected based on a
combination of relevant self-identified skills such
as red teaming, cyber operations, and systems
administration. Advanced adversaries often maliciously
utilize legitimate system administration tools as a
way of remaining undetected while illicitly accessing
systems. The intent of recruiting participants with
these experiences was to expand the pool of potential
participants to include those who, with cyber red team
training, could apply their skills successfully in a cyber
context.
Potential participants were required to complete
a prescreen test designed to identify those with the
baseline technical skills for the hands-on attack exercise
component of the study. The prescreen test included
questions with answers collected via free-form text
which allowed us to assess potential participants’ levels
of familiarity with commands and their ability to
situationally apply concepts that would be necessary to
successfully complete the task. Fifty-nine employees of
a mid-sized, east coast technical company participated
in the experiment.
4.2. Procedures
Prior to data collection, the study design was
approved by the appropriate Internal Review Board to
ensure all necessary human participant protections were
in place. Study sessions were conducted classroom-style
with one condition per session and five to thirteen
randomly-assigned participants and a team of three to
four proctors. Upon arrival, the lead proctor reiterated
the cover story and introduced the participants to the
proctors, each of whom was assigned a subset of
participants to assist during the study and administer
participant consent.
Study sessions had two main components consistent
with the study’s cover story: training and a hands-on
cyber attack exercise. During the training component,
participants watched a 1.5-hour red team training
video and were provided with handouts for later
reference. After the video, participants completed
a post-training survey that included the Big Five
personality inventory, questions about their technical
background, and questions about the understandability
of the training topics (in support of the cover
story). During the 2.5-hour hands-on attack exercise,
participants were provided with instructions and told to
work individually to attack a network. They were given
initial access to allow them to focus on post-exploit
TTPs. Their primary objective was to find a host that
was operating SCADA-related software and exfiltrate a
zip archive containing two files: the process list from the
host running SCADA software and the specific process
name and process ID of all processes on that host that
were related to the SCADA control systems.
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Following the exercise, participants completed a
post-task survey which contained questions to gauge
their thoughts and self-reported actions during the
attack, to identify their emotional reactions to the
attack, to understand prior professional experiences, and
questions designed to further support the cover story.
Participants were then debriefed and could leave.
All participants were provided with a small set of
pre-staged tools and told there were two specific tools
they would need to use: process dump.exe, which
produced the process list from a host as output, and
pscp for exfiltrating the zip file. Participants were
instructed to not use comparable system tools in lieu
of the specific pre-staged tools. Participants were told
that to achieve their objective, they needed to adopt a
red teamer mindset, use the pre-staged tools, and use
any other approaches they may have learned from the
training portion of the study. The TTPs required for
success were detailed in Section 3.3. Participants were
instructed to choose any host to attack, and, in the event
of failure, they could choose to attack the same host
again or a different host within the time allotted.
5. Sample Characteristics
Participants were asked to self-report their areas
of experience and skill level. The Control condition
had 30 participants, while the Deception condition had
29. There were no significant differences between
conditions on any of these questions. Of the participants,
73% had no experience with red teaming, 47% had
never performed a penetration test, and 34% had no
experience in network defense. The average years of
experience in each of the previous activities is given in
Figure 1 for all participants, followed by the number
of participants who reported no experience and the
average years of experience for those who listed any
experience. While the lack of experience is a limitation
of the experimental design, there were no significant
correlations found between the experience factors and
success on the cyber task. The strongest correlation with
experience in network defense accounted for less than
6% (r2 = .058) of the variance in success.
Participants were also asked to complete the BFI-44,
a test of the Five Factor Personality model. The
participants, when compared to a large normative
sample [18], scored higher on Agreeableness and
Conscientiousness and lower on Neuroticism.
This is consistent with results from another cyber
deception experiment using professional red teamers as
participants [4]. In both cases, while the scores for the
samples were slightly higher they remained within the
average range for each scale (Figure 2).
6. Results
To test the major hypothesis, that deceptive
responses will impede attacker progress, we compared
the number of participants in the two conditions who
were able to successfully complete the task assigned
to determine whether or not the deceptive command
line responses impeded progress. The participants were
provided the following instruction: “To achieve your
objective, you must exfiltrate a zip archive containing
two files. The first is the process list from a host
that is running SCADA software. The second is a file
that you generate from analyzing the process list and
identifying the process name and process ID (PID) of
all processes on that host that are related to the SCADA
control systems. All processes related to SCADA
control systems in this exercise will have the word
scada somewhere in the process name. For example,
log scada.exe would be a SCADA related process.”
Success at this task was determined by examining
the submitted zip archive for the requisite files. If the
file contained the complete process list or a summary
document with the SCADA-related files identified, as
described earlier, the task was considered successful.
The control condition was significantly more successful
than the deception condition as indicated by a χ2(1) =
7.03, p = 0.012 (Figure 3).
Another measure of effectiveness was the proportion
of TTP commands that were successful. The control and
deception condition were compared on the proportion
of TTP commands that were labeled successful. A
significant difference was found between the two
condition means (t(57) = 1.40, p = 0.013; Figure
4). Overall, 67% of the TTP commands submitted by
the control condition were successful compared to 55%
successful for the deception condition. This provides
one measure of impeded progress in the attack scenario.
In addition to preventing a successful attack,
deception can also impede progress of attackers through
the system. To test this, we compared participants in
both groups who successfully completed the task on
the total number of minutes they took from start to
end for the first success. Many participants actually
completed the task on multiple hosts. The summary
statistics for the conditions are provided in Figure 5.
There was a significant difference (t(26) = 2.29, p =
0.033) between the two conditions. The participants in
the Deception condition took on average 106 minutes
while the participants in the Control condition took
only 76 minutes. While a portion of this time can be
accounted for by the additional steps needed for success
in the Deception condition, the difference is larger than
necessary to accomplish those steps. To account for
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Figure 1. Self-Reported Experience of Participants
Figure 2. Five Factor Personality Scores of Participants
Figure 3. Participants performance on exfiltration
task
Figure 4. Proportion of successful commands
Figure 5. Time to Task Completion
the five-minute delay included in TTP4 in the deception
condition, 5 minutes was subtracted from the time to
complete TTP4 for each participant in the deceptive
condition before calculating total time. The fastest time
for the Deception participants was 64 minutes, more
than three times the mean for Control participants.
As you can see in Figure 6, almost a third
(9) of the Control participants completed the task
faster than any of the Deception participants. The
quickest completion rate for those who successfully
completed the exfiltration for TTP6 the first time was
20 minutes for Control and 64 minutes for Deception.
This provides additional evidence that the deceptive
responses significantly impeded progress as measured
by time necessary to attack the system. An additional
seven of the participants in the Deception condition
succeeded on TTP6, the last step, but did not do the
additional steps necessary to successfully complete the
task. This indicates they may have believed they actually
succeeded when in fact they did not. Not only did
the deceptive responses significantly impede progress
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Figure 6. Total Time to Complete TTPs 1-6
Figure 7. Time wasted on decoys
as measured by the time necessary to be successful
but also provided a false sense of success for those
in the Deception condition. Slowing progress of the
attackers and instilling a false sense of success provide
a significant defensive advantage.
For participants in the Deception condition, the total
amount of time spent attempting TTP2 on decoys vs
responsive hosts was calculated (See Figure 7). From
the participants perspective, when the target selected is
a decoy, TTP2 reports a deceptive success and TTP3
provides a failure message. This reflects the average
amount of time continuing to attempt to progress on
a decoy compared to the average amount of time to
complete TTP2 on a Responsive Host. Participants
spent significantly more time, 3.5 times the number of
minutes, on decoys than on responsive hosts (paired
samples t(58) = 4.45, p = .00007). This supports
previous research that demonstrated participants tend to
expend more resources on decoys [14]. We noted that
overall 97% of participants started by targeting either
the first or last IP numerically (which were decoys in
the Deception condition); 43% progressed through the
IPs in numeric order, starting either at the first or the
last.
After completion of the cyber task, participants were
Figure 8. Reported Confusion.
Figure 9. Reported Surprise
asked to rate their feelings of frustration, confusion,
doubt, and surprise related to their experience of the
task. While there was no significant difference found
between conditions on feelings of frustration or doubt,
significant differences were noted between the control
and the deception condition on the amount of confusion
felt due to the task (χ2(3) = 9.45, p = 0.024) and
whether or not participants were surprised by the task
(χ2(1) = 9.03, p = 0.003). (Figures 8 and 9,
respectively)
After the exercise, participants were asked if they
thought the system had tried to deceive them. There
was a significant difference in the answers between
the deception and control condition (χ2(1) = 7.28,
p = 0.007). Interestingly, less than half (41%) of those
in the deceptive condition thought that deception was
involved (Figure 10). This might reflect the operation
of an innate cognitive bias, in which, confirmation bias
influenced the attacker’s perception that the network’s
representation was accurate and that their commands
executed as expected, even after being presented with an
alternative hypothesis in the form of the question asked.
Previous researchers have discussed a similar effect in
decision-making biases in the cyber domain [17] as
well as how understanding these biases can aid in cyber
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Figure 10. System attempt to deceive
defense [18].
To examine the extent to which our
participants–computer specialists given minimal red
team training–might resemble the broader population
of interest, we examined the performance of the
participants in the control condition. This condition
did not encounter any deception and, therefore, their
performance provides an estimate of the success rate for
individuals who were not considered red teamers. Only
63% of the control condition was able to successfully
complete the task after the training. Thus, it appears
that individuals without specific experience related to
the task at hand are not ideal participants for testing
of cyber defensive deception because the success rates
will be lowered due to lack of experience rather than the
experimental treatment.
Given this difficulty with the task attributed to
inexperience, we must question if some of the
differences found were not attributed to deception
but rather to inexperience. However, participants of
differing skill levels were equally distributed between
the conditions and the relation between experience and
successful completion of the task was tested and found
to be non-significant for all conditions as indicated in
Figure 1. Therefore, it is likely that the effects noted are
correctly attributed to deception.
It has previously been assumed that red teamers are
a valid representation of adversaries [19]. However, the
lack of availability and the expense of hiring them makes
it difficult to use them for participants. As such, we used
computer professionals and gave them red team training
so that they could stand in for professional red teamers
on a simple task. In the process, we discovered that
individuals without specific experience related to the
task at hand are not appropriate participants for testing
of cyber defensive deception because the success rates
will be lowered due to lack of experience rather than the
experimental treatment. Given the reduction in success
rates due to inexperience noted earlier, we concluded
that to adequately test host or network defenses requires
participants that have expert knowledge and experience
with penetration testing. We consider this knowledge as
a valuable lesson that can benefit future studies.
7. Discussion
7.1. Limitations
There were some limitations to the study design.
Internal validity was limited by the deceptive
methodology used which only provided deceptive
responses to a limited number of predetermined
commands. Participants could bypass deception by
using commands that performed similar functions
but were not on the bypass list. We mitigated this
possibility by constraining the participants’ command
and program usage through detailed instructions and
technical solutions. However this effects the external
validity by artificially influencing the attack behavior.
External validity was limited due to the population
from which the participants were drawn. While the
ideal participant pool would have been individuals
whose skills and experience more closely resembled
cyber adversaries, it was decided to employ computer
specialists who did not necessarily have such experience
to give us a large enough pool of participants. However,
even with these limitations, the results indicated
that deception significantly degraded participants’
performance.
Construct validity in any timing analysis was a
concern due to the extra time forced by the responsive
hosts in the deceptive condition. We addressed this by
adjusting the data to account for the delay imposed in the
deception condition. Results supported the hypothesis
that in addition to impeding attack, deceptive responses
can cause a critical delay (allowing time for cyber
defenders to mitigate the threat).
7.2. Conclusions
To summarize, deception reduced participants’
ability to attack a network and significantly slowed
the progress of those who were able to attack it.
Even given the difficulty that some participants in
the control condition had in completing the task, the
control condition performed significantly better than the
deception condition in accomplishing the exfiltration
objective. Host-based deception effectively impeded
progress, prevented task completion and induced
increased confusion and surprise in those attempting to
exfiltrate targeted information. Slowing the progress of
attackers and instilling a false sense of success provided
a significant defensive advantage. As one participant in
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the deception condition stated in the interview following
the task, “[the] most challenging [part of the task] was I
couldn’t tell if it was me or the network.”
Previous research [14] has found similar
interference with task completion and effect on
cognitive processes using network deception. This
alteration of cognitions, i.e., increased confusion
and surprise, may have a more persistent effect as it
potentially influences future attacks or reduces the
attacker’s confidence in the validity of any information
obtained. Defensive cyber deception appears to be
a promising method to re-balance the asymmetry
of cyber defense not only in delaying or impeding
attacks but also in affecting the cognitive processes
of the attacker. Very few published studies have
utilized an experimental design that includes human
experts. This research, one of the first of its kind,
provided the necessary rigor to scientifically attest to
the effectiveness of cyber deception for cyber defense
with computer specialists.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank all the professionals
who volunteered to participate in this study and
gratefully acknowledge the following people for the
roles they played in the success of this research: Dr.
Dana LaFon, Dr. Ahmad Ridley, Rick Van Tassel, Mary
Berlage, Steve Danko, Adam Pennington, Frank Duff,
Dr. Deanna Caputo, Dr. Nick Kohn, Cory Minter, Chris
Alicea. We’d also like to thank Thomas Parisi and Dr.
Edward “Paul” Ratazzi from the Air Force Research
Laboratory as well as the Moonraker development team.
References
[1] N. Provos, “A Virtual Honeypot Framework,” in
Proceedings of the 13th Conference on USENIX Security
Symposium - Volume 13, SSYM’04, (Berkeley, CA,
USA), pp. 1–1, USENIX Association, 2004.
[2] L. Spitzner, “The honeynet project: Trapping the
hackers,” IEEE Security and Privacy, vol. 1, pp. 15–23,
Mar. 2003.
[3] B. M. Bowen, S. Hershkop, A. D. Keromytis, and
S. J. Stolfo, “Baiting Inside Attackers Using Decoy
Documents,” in Security and Privacy in Communication
Networks (Y. Chen, T. D. Dimitriou, and J. Zhou,
eds.), Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer
Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications
Engineering, pp. 51–70, Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2009.
[4] K. J. Ferguson-Walter, T. B. Shade, A. V. Rogers, E. M.
Niedbala, M. C. Trumbo, K. Nauer, K. M. Divis, A. P.
Jones, A. Combs, and R. G. Abbott, “The Tularosa
Study: An Experimental Design and Implementation
to Quantify the Effectiveness of Cyber Deception,”
in Proceedings of the 52nd Hawaii International
Conference on System Sciences, p. 10, Jan. 2019.
[5] S. Achleitner, T. La Porta, P. McDaniel, S. Sugrim,
S. V. Krishnamurthy, and R. Chadha, “Cyber deception:
Virtual networks to defend insider reconnaissance,”
in Proceedings of the 8th ACM CCS International
Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats, MIST
’16, (New York, NY, USA), pp. 57–68, ACM, 2016.
[6] X. Han, N. Kheir, and D. Balzarotti, “Deception
techniques in computer security: A research
perspective,” ACM Comput. Surv., vol. 51,
pp. 80:1–80:36, July 2018.
[7] K. Ferguson-Walter, S. Fugate, J. Mauger, and M. Major,
“Game theory for adaptive defensive cyber deception,” in
Hot Topics in Science of Security (HoTSoS), (Nashville,
Tennessee), ACM, Apr. 2019.
[8] N. C. Rowe, “Designing good deceptions in defense of
information systems,” in 20th Annual Computer Security
Applications Conference, pp. 418–427, Dec 2004.
[9] N. Rowe and J. Rrushi, Introduction to Cyberdeception.
Springer International Publishing, 2016.
[10] P. Karuna, H. Purohit, R. Ganesan, and S. Jajodia,
“Generating Hard to Comprehend Fake Documents for
Defensive Cyber Deception,” IEEE Intelligent Systems,
vol. 33, pp. 16–25, 2018.
[11] Z. Shu and G. Yan, “Ensuring Deception Consistency
for FTP Services Hardened Against Advanced Persistent
Threats,” in Proceedings of the 5th ACM Workshop on
Moving Target Defense, MTD ’18, (New York, NY,
USA), pp. 69–79, ACM, 2018. event-place: Toronto,
Canada.
[12] J. H. Jafarian, A. Niakanlahiji, E. Al-Shaer, and Q. Duan,
“Multi-dimensional Host Identity Anonymization for
Defeating Skilled Attackers,” in Proceedings of the
2016 ACM Workshop on Moving Target Defense, MTD
’16, (New York, NY, USA), pp. 47–58, ACM, 2016.
event-place: Vienna, Austria.
[13] S. B. Murphy, Deceiving Adversary Network Scanning
Efforts Using Host-Based Deception. Air Force Institute
of Technology, Defense Technical Information Center
(DTIC), 2009.
[14] K. J. Ferguson-Walter, D. S. LaFon, and T. B. Shade,
“Friend or Faux: Deception for Cyber Defense,” Journal
of Information Warfare, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 28–42, 2017.
[15] B. E. Strom, A. Applebaum, D. P. Miller, K. C.
Nickels, A. G. Pennington, and C. B. Thomas,
“MITRE ATT&CKTM : Design and Philosophy,”
MITRE Coperation Technical Report, 2018.
[16] O. P. John and S. Srivastava, “The Big-Five trait
taxonomy: History, measurement, and theoretical
perspectives.,” in Handbook of Personality: Theory and
Research, vol. 2, pp. 102–138, New York, NY, USA:
Guilford Press, l. a. pervin & o. p. john ed., 1999.
[17] R. S. Gutzwiller, K. J. Ferguson-Walter, and S. J. Fugate,
“Are cyber attackers thinking fast and slow? Evidence
for cognitive biases in red teamers reveals a method
for disruption,” Proceedings of the Human Factors and
Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, Oct. 2019.
[18] R. Gutzwiller, K. J. Ferguson-Walter, S. Fugate, and
A. Rogers, “’Oh, Look, A butterfly!’ A framework
for distracting attackers to improve cyber defense,”
Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics
Society Annual Meeting, Oct. 2018.
Page 1884
